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ABSTRACT
More than a decade ago, Napster brought the issue of copyright infringement by file-sharing to the
center of the public stage. How would a body of copyright law built to regulate tangible objects apply
in the digital realm? The safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, intended
as a compromise between the interests of copyright owners and webhosts, have instead introduced
legal uncertainty and allocated the costs of online enforcement both inefficiently and
disproportionately. While Napster and several other major peer-to-peer services have been
shuttered in the intervening period, the scope of online copyright infringement continues to grow
apace. One avenue of that growth has been the advent of a certain class of “cyberlockers”—file
storage sites that incentivize and profit from mass infringement. Focusing on two particularly
controversial cyberlockers, this comment analyzes the current state of copyright law on the Internet
and suggests comprehensive, practical reforms with an aim to achieving a sustainable reduction in
online infringement.
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HOTFILE, MEGAUPLOAD, AND THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT ON THE
INTERNET: WHAT CAN CYBERLOCKERS TELL US ABOUT DMCA REFORM?
ROSS DRATH*
INTRODUCTION
Think of your favorite movie. Now type that movie’s name into a simple
Internet search, adding the word “download” (you can even ignore your search
engine’s suggestion to include the word “free”). You are now practicing the most
rudimentary, least efficient method of pirating a film; and yet, if you want to, you
will own a digital copy of the movie—a product of countless man-hours and extensive
investment—likely in less than an hour.1
File-sharing of copyrighted works exists in several forms. Over the past decade,
popularity has shifted from peer-to-peer services like Limewire and Kazaa to
BitTorrent sites like the Pirate Bay, and most recently to a certain class of cloud
storage sites called “cyberlockers.”2 Though there is a dearth of reliable data
regarding the scale of infringement-by-file-sharing, few honest observers argue that
such activity occurs on a less than substantial basis.3

* © Ross Drath 2012. J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago,
Illinois. B.A. in Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Many thanks to my
friends and family for their invaluable support, encouragement, tolerance, and patience. Thanks
also to the editorial staff of the John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law for its
instrumental assistance in preparing this comment. Any errors are my own.
1 United States, NETINDEX.COM, http://www.netindex.com/download/2,1/United-States/ (last
visited Nov. 14, 2012) (reporting an average download speed of 15.36 megabits per second for U.S.
users); Physical Parameters, MPEG.ORG, http://www.mpeg.org/MPEG/DVD/Book_A/Specs.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2012) (stating DVD capacity is 4.7 Gigabytes). While download speeds and file sizes
will vary significantly, a 4.7 GB file would take approximately 43 minutes to download at a rate of
15.17 megabits per second.
2 See Eriq Gardner, Read the MPAA’s Big Lawsuit Against ‘Cyberlocking’ Site Hotfile, THE
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 8, 2011, 12:04 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/blogs/thr-esq/readmpaas-big-lawsuit-cyberlocking-97400 (“Cyberlockers are file-hosting websites whose stated purpose
is to give users personal storage room for large files.”). In a recent study, MarkMonitor, a brand
security company, surveyed web-traffic data for sites dedicated to copyright and trademark
infringement. MARKMONITOR, TRAFFIC REPORT: ONLINE PIRACY AND COUNTERFEITING (2011),
available
at
https://www.markmonitor.com/download/report/MarkMonitor__Traffic_Report_110111.pdf. According to the study, the three most-visited digital piracy sites
(rapidshare.com, megaupload.com, and megavideo.com) include two cyberlockers and a video
streaming site that operates under the same brand name as one of those cyberlockers. Id. at 7; see
also Cyberlockers Take Over File-Sharing Lead from BitTorrent Sites, TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 11,
2011), http://torrentfreak.com/
cyberlockers-take-over-file-sharing-lead-from-bittorrent-sites-110111/ (“All signs indicate that filestorage services are becoming the new sharing standard.”).
3 See David G. Post, SOPA and the Future of Internet Governance, JUSTIA.COM (Feb. 13, 2012),
http://verdict.justia.com/2012/02/13/sopa-and-the-future-of-internet-governance (“[N]obody can deny
that there are an enormous number of [offshore websites offering copyrighted works for download],
that many of them make a great deal of money by trampling on the legitimate rights of copyright
and trademark owners, and that the consequent damage to those rights holders is substantial.”).
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In general, cloud storage sites provide substantial, legal cost benefits for
consumers and service providers alike: Users receive a convenience benefit—they
can access all the files they care to upload, anywhere and on any device with an
internet connection; for their part, the proprietors of cloud storage sites maintain a
consistent volume of use which they can translate into advertising and membership
revenue. In recent years, the market for cloud storage has grown exponentially as
more and more technology companies have come to recognize the value of this
product.4 The question is how to deter or devalue cloud services that are specifically
designed to profit from infringement without impinging on non-infringing services.
The stated goal of Copyright Law is to produce public benefits by promoting
progress in creative endeavors.5 In the context of the Internet, “dual purpose”
technologies (those that are capable of both infringing and non-infringing use) raise
three competing public interests: (1) fostering authorship by protecting incentives to
create, (2) promoting technological innovation, and (3) safeguarding free speech and
the free flow of information.6
Parts I.A and I.B of this comment will trace the common law development of the
doctrines of direct infringement and secondary liability as applied to online service
providers. Part I.C will discuss the safe harbor provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA): how a webhost can qualify for safe harbor protection under
the statute, and specifically how § 512(c) interacts with the secondary and direct
liability doctrines to affect online webhosts’ liability for users’ acts of infringement.
Part III will examine the legal status of cyberlockers under that precedent, with
particular attention to recent cases involving two major cyberlockers. Part IV
surveys several solutions advanced by commentators and legislators, and proposes a
set of significant changes to the existing scheme with the aim of establishing wellneeded legal certainty and providing smart economic incentives to all parties
involved. Part V sets forth a brief conclusion.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Direct Infringement
The Copyright Act of 1976 confers enumerated exclusive rights on the owner of a
copyright.7 Unauthorized use of copyrighted material, in violation of any of those
4 See Press Release, Int’l Data Corp., Demand from Pub. Cloud Serv. Providers and Private
Cloud Adopters Will Drive Strong Growth for Full Range of Storage Solutions, According to IDC
(Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS23097611 (estimating that “[b]y
2015, combined spending for public and private cloud storage will be $22.6 billion worldwide.”).
5 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”).
6 Jane Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster Goats: Reckoning the Future
Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 577, 579 (2008).
7 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012). The Act specifies six exclusive rights: reproduction, distribution,
adaptation, public performance, public display, and, in the case of sound recordings, public
performance by digital transmission. Id.
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exclusive rights, constitutes infringement.8 To prove direct copyright infringement,
then, a plaintiff must show that she owns a valid copyright in the relevant work and
that the alleged infringer copied that work in violation of one or more of the exclusive
rights enumerated in § 106 of the Copyright Act.9 Early on in the development of the
Internet, one court held that the operator of a bulletin board service directly
infringed copyrights in photographs that had been uploaded to the system
independently by its subscribers.10
Since the 1995 decision in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom, Inc.,11
however, the case law has quite clearly gone the other way. That is, most courts
have adopted the view that, absent “volitional conduct” designed to cause
infringement, online service providers do not directly infringe copyrights when their
systems automatically and indifferently process users’ upload and download
requests.12
Commentators consider the Netcom framework to be fairly well established,13
but in a narrow and parallel line of cases several courts have found its volitional
requirement met by certain methods of system operation.14 The touchstone in these
cases seems to be human intervention.
Most notably, in Playboy v. Russ
Hardenburgh, the Northern District Court of Ohio held a system operator liable for
direct infringement where its employees reviewed uploads before making them
available for download.15
But in the CoStar case, in 2004, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
ruled the other way on similar facts, holding that employee review of user-posted
material does not rise to the level of volitional conduct where the employees’ conduct
does not itself constitute infringement.16
17 U.S.C. § 501.
Id.; see also Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991).
10 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
11 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
12 Id. at 1369–70.
Although some of the people using the machine may directly infringe copyrights,
courts analyze the machine owner's liability under the rubric of contributory
infringement, not direct infringement . . . . Although copyright is a strict liability
statute, there should still be some element of volition or causation which is lacking
where a defendant's system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.
Id.(emphasis added); see also Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 497 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
(“When an ISP automatically and temporarily stores data without human intervention so that the
system can operate and transmit data to its users, the necessary element of volition is missing.”).
13 See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12B.01[A][1] (2012)
[hereinafter NIMMER] (noting that Congress broadly endorsed the Netcom result in enacting the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act); R. Anthony Reese, The Relationship Between the ISP Safe
Harbors and the Ordinary Rules of Copyright Liability, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 427, 430–31 (2009)
(reporting a trend in favor of the Netcom approach).
14 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 552 (N.D. Tex. 1997)
(distinguishing Netcom on the ground that the system operator altered the files and “took
affirmative steps to cause the copies to be made”); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc.,
982 F. Supp. 503, 513 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (distinguishing Netcom on the ground that the system
operator had a policy of encouraging subscribers to upload files and its employees viewed and moved
the uploaded files).
15 982 F. Supp. at 513.
16 CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004) (real estate company
employees checked user uploads for blatant infringement before posting them); see also Cartoon
8
9
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In recent years, three district court decisions—two of them involving digital file
lockers—have upheld (against 12(b)(6) challenge) direct infringement claims brought
against online service providers, on the ground that certain organizational
techniques and marketing initiatives meet the volitional conduct requirement.17 In
Usenet, for example, several record companies sued an online subscription bulletin
board that was being used to share plaintiffs’ copyrighted content. Following the
reasoning in Russ Hardenburgh, the court held that by programming its system to
dedicate servers to specific types of files, and by taking “active steps, including both
automated filtering and human review, to remove access to certain categories of
content, and to block certain users,” defendant had directly infringed plaintiffs’
copyrights as a matter of law.18
B. Secondary Liability
Commentators disagree as to whether the Copyright Act of 1976 explicitly
recognizes indirect liability.19 Nevertheless, as a matter of both statutory authority
and common law, courts have long imposed liability on third parties to direct
infringement pursuant to two distinct but often muddled doctrines: contributory
infringement and vicarious liability.20

Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008). The court in Cartoon Network
explained the volitional act requirement in the context of a television service provider’s liability for
its customers’ allegedly infringing use of its digital video recording machines: “the person who
actually presses the button to make the recording supplies the necessary element of volition, not the
person who manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct from the operator, owns the machine.” Id.
17 Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 148–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Capitol
Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96521 at *13 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 16, 2009) (citing Russ Hardenburgh and Usenet in denying a motion to dismiss a direct
infringement claim where defendant music locker collected and organized links for its customers to
listen to and download); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., No. 11 cv 0191, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
81931 at *13 (S.D. Cal. 2011). In Megaupload, the court denied a motion to dismiss a direct
infringement claim, applying this reasoning to an online storage site widely used to share
copyrighted films, where the site paid and encouraged users to upload popular files, paid third party
sites to maintain inventory of available files, and created distinct websites dedicated to specific
types of content. Megaupload, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81931 at *12–*13.
18 Russ Hardenburgh, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 148.
19 Compare
Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright
Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 395, 396 (2003) (“[T]he Copyright
Act of 1976 does not explicitly recognize the possibility of indirect liability.”), with 6 WILLIAM F.
PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 21.43 (2011) (citing legislative history of the 1976 Act to the effect
that section 106 includes the phrase “to authorize” for the specific, intended purpose of providing for
indirect liability).
20 Lichtman & Landes, supra note 19, at 396.
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1. Contributory Infringement
Courts have established two elements necessary to a finding of contributory
infringement: the accused party must have knowledge of the infringing activity, and
she must “materially contribute” to the infringing conduct.21
a. Knowledge
While courts agree that the knowledge requirement should be objective, many
have had difficulty in deciding the degree of knowledge necessary to justify
imposition of liability, particularly in file-sharing and internet-based cases.22 The
critical question is whether a showing of constructive knowledge is sufficient. That
is, whether a plaintiff must prove actual knowledge of the infringing activity, or
whether some middle standard should apply.23
Constructive knowledge, or
knowledge imputed to a defendant based on the nature of her conduct, has been held
sufficient in several cases.24
Conversely, many courts, particularly in a line of digital-context cases, have
applied a tighter standard—requiring a showing of actual knowledge of specific
infringing activity.25 The issue is complicated by the presence or absence of
“substantial non-infringing uses” for the relevant product.26
b. Material Contribution
A defendant materially contributes to copyright infringement when she actively
causes the infringer to commit the infringement, or when she “provide[s] the means
by which the infringement occurs.”27 This second form of material contribution has
been interpreted loosely, and many courts have held it satisfied where the defendant
provided the “site and facilities” of the infringement.28 A recent major Ninth Circuit
21 Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d. Cir. 1971)
(“[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to
the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.”).
22 Craig A. Grossman. From Sony to Grokster, The Failure of the Copyright Doctrines of
Contributory Infringement and Vicarious Liability to Resolve the War Between Content and
Destructive Technologies, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 151–52 (2005).
23 Id. at 152 n.12; see also 6 PATRY, supra note 19, § 21.47.
24 Cable/Home Comm. Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F. 2d 829, 845 (11th Cir. 1990); Sega
Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 933 (N.D. Cal. 1996); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334
F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
25 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc, 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that “a
computer system operator can be held contributorily liable if it “has actual knowledge that specific
infringing material is available using its system”) (emphasis in original) (quoting A&M Records v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001)); MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d
1154, 1162 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
26 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
27 6 PATRY, supra note 19, § 21.48.
28 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996). Vendors at a swap meet
sold thousands of infringing recordings. The owner of the copyrights in many of those works sued
the swap meet, alleging inter alia, contributory and vicarious copyright infringement. Id. Since the
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case suggests reining in this expansive interpretation to avoid the substantial costs
of imposing liability on peripheral parties to Internet transactions.29 In Visa, the
court held that there was no material contribution where defendant processed online
payments for websites that sold infringing photographs.30 Further, it distinguished
Amazon.com on the ground that payment systems’ contribution was more attenuated
than that of search engines: “there is an additional step in the causal chain: Google
[a defendant in Amazon.com] may materially contribute to infringement by making it
fast and easy for third parties to locate and distribute infringing material, whereas
Defendants make it easier for infringement to be profitable, which tends to increase
financial incentives to infringe, which in turn tends to increase infringement.”31 The
majority’s narrowed reading prompted a rigorous dissent.32
2. Vicarious Liability
While contributory infringement requires evidence of culpable action, vicarious
liability, finding its origins in the strict liability principles of respondeat superior,
focuses on the defendant’s “right and ability to control” the infringing activity and
whether the defendant stands to receive a financial benefit from it.33 Importantly,
vicarious liability is imposed where these two elements “coalesce,”—where the
financial benefit is secured by the right to control, and thus where the policy goal of
promoting self-regulation is likely to be effectuated.34
Defendant’s knowledge of the infringing activities was not in dispute, the only issue was whether
the defendant materially contributed to the infringing activity. Id. at 264. In holding the defendant
liable for contributory infringement and eschewing the district court’s “expressly promoted or
encouraged” standard, the court argued that by providing the vendors (direct infringers) with a
variety of services, including “space, utilities, parking, advertising, plumbing, and customers,” the
defendants had contributed sufficiently to warrant imposition of contributory liability. Id. This
looser standard is commonly referred to as the “site and facilities rule.” See also Amazon, 487 F.3d
at 729 (“[Defendant] could be held contributorily liable if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10
images were available using its search engine, could take simple measures to prevent further
damage to Perfect 10's copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps.”).
29 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 797–98 (9th Cir. 2007).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 797.
32 Id. at 811–14 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
Judge Kosinski argued that Amazon was not
distinguishable and that the majority had turned its back on not only that case, but Fonovisa,
Napster, and Grokster as well. Id. at 813. “The majority makes some very new—and very bad—law
here.” Id. at 814. See also 3 NIMMER, supra note 13, § 12.04[A][3][a] (finding the majority opinion
“difficult to understand coherently,” and endorsing Judge Kozinski’s dissent: “In sum, although the
Ninth Circuit has spoken to the issue of contributory copyright infringement far more often and
more recently than any other tribunal, Visa International leaves its jurisprudence indeterminate.”).
33 Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Canus Prods., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2001). See also
Lichtman & Landes, supra note 19, at 398. The authors posit three policy rationales for vicarious
liability in the context of copyright infringement: (1) providing incentives to self-police for
infringement, (2) reducing costs by allowing copyright owners to pursue one lawsuit rather than go
after the multitude of direct infringers, and (3) ensuring that adequate relief can be granted by
removing the specter of bankrupt direct infringers). Id.
34 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307–08 (2d Cir. 1963)
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvious and direct
financial interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials-even in the absence
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a. Right and Ability to Control
The “right and ability to control” element refers to the defendant’s ultimate right
to exclude infringers from using its service or revoke their capacity to infringe.35 As
vicarious liability has its roots in the so-called “dance hall cases,”36 “right and ability
to control” analysis focuses on the location (whether physical or digital) where the
infringement took place, and asks whether the defendant could control what
happened there.37
b. Financial Benefit
In the dance hall cases and their progeny, the financial benefit required for
imposition of vicarious liability had to be “obvious and direct.”38 In the time since
those cases were decided, courts have extended that limited understanding of the
requirement.39 Many courts now ask whether the presence of infringing activity
drew potential customers to the place of business.40 This expansive interpretation
has also found particular application in the Internet context.41

of actual knowledge that the copyright monopoly is being impaired . . . the
purposes of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of liability
upon the beneficiary of that exploitation . . . our judgment will simply encourage
[defendant] to [“police carefully the conduct of its (employee)”], thus placing
responsibility where it can and should be effectively exercised.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
35 Id. at 308; see also Visa Int’l, 494 F.3d 788 at 804 n.15. The court in Visa held an online
payment processer not vicariously liable for infringement. Visa, 494 F.3d at 804 n.15. It
distinguished Napster, which held a peer-to-peer system operator vicariously liable for its users’
direct infringement, and followed the 9th Circuit decision in Grokster, which held a peer-to-peer
system operator not vicariously liable for its users’ infringement
in part because they could not block individual users or remove copyrighted
material from the network. Defendants have no ability to actually remove
infringing material from the Internet or directly block its distribution. This
distinguishes credit card companies from Napster, which could block access to the
tools needed for the easy reproduction and distribution of the actual infringing
content.
Id.
36 See, e.g., Herbert v. Shanley, 242 U.S. 591 (1917) (holding a hotel vicariously liable where its
hired musicians publicly performed copyrighted music without authorization).
37 Grossman, supra note 22, at 249–53. Professor Grossman argues that, due to the everexpanding reach of digital networks [and the correspondingly ever-expanding control of system
operators], application of this location-based reasoning in the digital realm implicates Fourth
Amendment and right to privacy concerns.
38 Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307.
39 Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 263 (9th Cir. 1996).
The court in
Fonovisa rejected Defendant’s argument that the financial benefit must be “a commission, directly
tied to the sale of particular infringing items,” and contended instead that the essence of the
financial benefit requirement in the dance hall cases was that the “infringing performances
enhance[d] the attractiveness of the venue to potential customers.” Id. If the infringing activity is a
“draw” for customers, the financial benefit requirement is met. Id.
40 See Polygram Int’l Publ’g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1326 (D. Mass. 1994)
(citing Judiciary Committee report on the 1976 Copyright Act for the proposition that in order to
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3. Sony and “substantial non-infringing uses”
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Supreme Court was
tasked with deciding whether to impose secondary liability on Sony for
manufacturing and distributing Betamax machines that were capable of reproducing
copyrighted works.42 The Court adopted the “staple article of commerce” doctrine
from patent law, holding that “the sale of copying equipment ... does not constitute
contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”43 This expansive language would seem to provide a powerful
defense to indirect liability, but in practice very few courts have ruled in favor of such
a defense since Sony.44
4. Grokster and inducement liability
21 years after Sony, in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,45 the Supreme Court
once again had occasion to address the issue of a technology company’s liability for
the infringing activities of its customers. The Court declined to elaborate on the Sony
rule, instead adopting another factually appropriate doctrine from patent lawinducement of infringement.46 Under this new understanding of secondary liability
for copyright infringement, “one who distributes a device with the object of promoting
its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third
parties.”47 Commentators and courts disagree as to whether the Grokster decision
meet the financial benefit requirement a defendant need only “expect commercial gain from the
operation and either direct or indirect benefit for the infringing performance”).
41 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
(following the “draw” logic from Fonovisa: “Cybernet benefits directly from these infringing sites to
the extent that they have brought in new users because the new customers pay Cybernet directly”);
see also A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Napster's future
revenue is directly dependent upon ‘increases in user base.’”) (emphasis added).
42 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
43 Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
Since the court held time-shifting of television programs
constituted fair use, Sony was not contributorily liable for selling Betamax machines to the public.
Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012) (providing that the sale of a “staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use” does not constitute patent infringement).
44 See Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 951–952 (2005)
(collecting cases in which courts declined to accept the Sony defense); see also In re Aimster
Copyright Litig., 334 F. 3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding mere capability of substantial noninfringing use insufficient to assert a Sony defense and requiring evidence of actual non-infringing
use).
45 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
46 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as
an infringer.”).
47 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–37.
The Court distinguished Sony: “Sony barred secondary
liability based on presuming or imputing intent to cause infringement solely from the design or
distribution of a product capable of substantial lawful use, which the distributor knows is in fact
used for infringement.” Id. at 934. By contrast, the Grokster defendants’ intent to cause
infringement (to the level of active inducement) was established by extrinsic evidence: (1) They
marketed themselves as an alternative to Napster, an infringing service, (2) they took no steps (such
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created a new cause of action or merely put a gloss on existing copyright
jurisprudence.48
C. Safe Harbors under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
In 1998, Congress passed the Online Copyright Infringement Liability
Limitation Act (OCILLA) as part of the DMCA, in an attempt to foster cooperation
between content providers and online service providers and thereby minimize
infringement.49
OCILLA establishes four distinct “safe harbors” 50—each representing a carefully
defined set of circumstances under which an online service provider is exempted from
copyright liability.51 To qualify for any of the four safe harbor exemptions, an online
service provider must demonstrate compliance with subsection (i), which requires
system operators to “adopt and reasonably implement” repeat infringer policies52 and
to accommodate certain “standard technical measures,” to be defined by a broad
consensus of interested parties.53 Since no consensus has been reached with regard

as content filtering) to diminish infringement, and (3) their business plans isolated advertisement as
the revenue stream and therefore depended on high-volume use of their service, and “the evidence
shows that substantive volume is a function of free access to copyrighted work.” Id. at 939–40.
Thus, where the evidence shows that the defendant actively induced infringement, she does not get
the benefit of the Sony defense. Id.
48 See 3 NIMMER, supra note 13, § 12.04[A][4][b]. Nimmer argues that Grokster should be read
as carving out a new theory of liability, but notes that it could be read as an elaboration of
contributory liability. Id. He highlights the Ninth Circuit’s divergent treatment of the Grokster
precedent in Amazon.com and Visa. Id.
49 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012); see also ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625
(4th Cir. 2001) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 72 (1998) (Conf. Rep.)).
The DMCA was enacted both to preserve copyright enforcement on the
Internet and to provide immunity to service providers from copyright
infringement liability for “passive,” “automatic” actions in which a service
provider's system engages through a technological process initiated by another
without the knowledge of the
service provider.
Id.
50 17 U.S.C. § 512. The four safe harbors are: (a) Transitory digital network communications,
(b) System caching, (c) Information residing on systems or networks at direction of users, and (d)
Information location tools. Id.
51 See CoStar, 373 F.3d 544 at 555.
It is clear that Congress intended the DMCA's safe harbor for ISPs to be a
floor, not a ceiling, of protection. Congress said nothing about whether passive
ISPs should ever be held strictly liable as direct infringers or whether plaintiffs
suing ISPs should instead proceed under contributory theories. The DMCA has
merely added a second step to assessing infringement liability for Internet service
providers, after it is determined whether they are infringers in the first place
under the preexisting Copyright Act.
Id. (emphasis added).
52 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (“a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate
circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network who
are repeat infringers”).
53 Id. § 512(i)(1)(B). The statute defines “standard technical measures” as
technical measures that are used by copyright owners to identify or protect
copyrighted works and--
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to standard technical measures, this second requirement has essentially been
nullified by practice in the years since passage of the DMCA.54
In the context of cloud storage, the most relevant safe harbor is § 512(c).55 The
statute conditions the exemption on the presence of one of three conditions. The first
of these, the knowledge requirement, is itself a three-pronged, disjunctive condition—
that the online service provider:
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity
using the material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously
to remove, or disable access to, the material[.]56
Given that one of these is met, the service provider must also show that it
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the
right and ability to control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement . . . responds
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.57
Importantly, recent case law expresses uncertainty as to whether the § 512(c)
safe harbor protects webhosts from claims of vicarious liability,58 and whether
webhosts that induce infringement under the Grokster standard are ineligible for the
safe harbor exemption.59
D. The Controversial Elements of Cyberlockers
Cyberlockers execute a variety of business plans, incorporating various
components in different ways. Importantly, many, even most cyberlockers have
(A) have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of copyright owners and
service providers in an open, fair, voluntary, multi-industry standards process;
(B) are available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms; and
(C) do not impose substantial costs on service providers or substantial burdens on
their systems or networks.
Id. § 512(i)(2).
54 See 3 NIMMER, supra note 13, § 12B.02[B][3][a] (“Even as of many years after enactment of
the [OCILLA], it is unclear whether there is any such thing as “standard technical measures.”).
55 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). The service provider must also follow a specified procedure to designate
an agent to receive notices of infringement from copyright owners, and the notices must meet a
series of technical and substantive requirements. Id. § 512(c)(3).
56 Id. § 512(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
57 Id. § 512(c)(1)(B)–(C) (emphasis added).
58 See Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 233, 235–46
(2009) (discussing competing theories and recent case law as to whether § 512(c) exempts webhosts
from vicarious liability).
59 Compare Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(holding that Grokster’s “application to the particular subset of service providers protected by the
DMCA is strained”), with Viacom Int’l, Inc., v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F. 3d 19, 40 (2d Cir. 2012)
(positing in dictum that “inducement of copyright infringement under [Grokster] . . . might . . . rise
to the level of control under § 512(c)(1)(B).”).
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avoided the dark cloud of massive infringement allegations and are perceived as
legitimate.60 It is instructive, then, to highlight the features that copyright owners
(and governments) typically find objectionable: (1) public (as opposed to passwordprotected) sharing capability;61 (2) direct linking;62 (3) lack of search function;63
and(4) rewards programs.64
Password-protected private storage is the core service of many cyberlockers, and
is clearly non-infringing.65 But even those cyberlockers typically seen as legitimate
offer public sharing, and with good reason—a user should be entitled, for example, to
tweet a publicly accessible link to her copyrighted short story. The problem, at least
as copyright owners see it, is that the same feature that allows her to share her story,
when combined with other features of the cyberlocker business plan, facilitates largescale copyright infringement.
Many cyberlockers allow users with no connection to a file’s uploader to download
that file.66 Though many of them disaggregate search functionality, copyright owners
argue that this tactic has little practical effect on the user who is looking to find a
specific file.67 That is, instead of using a search tool on the website itself, a user can
just search on a regular search engine for the name of a work along with the name of
a cyberlocker (e.g. “hunger games mediafire”) and out will pop a series of links, both
to download pages themselves and to third-party sites that aggregate download links
to files hosted by cyberlockers.68 This is a classic “damned if you do, damned if you
don’t” situation. Internal search functionality has been looked to as evidence of
intent to foster infringement in the past because it makes it easier for a user to find

60 See, e.g., Jared Newman, How to Choose Between Cloud Storage Services Like Google Drive
and Dropbox, TIME MAG. (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.techland.time.com/2012/04/27/how-to-choosebetween-cloud-storage-services-like-google-drive-and-dropbox/ (analyzing strengths and weaknesses
of four popular legitimate file locker services).
61 See Complaint at 5, Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. FF Magnat Ltd., No. 12-cv-01057 (D.
Nev. June 20, 2012), available at www.xbiz.com/docs/xbiz/news/150218_corbin fisher v oron
062012.pdf (“the primary purpose of this storage capacity and allowing rapid public access to it is
the unauthorized use and exchange of copyrighted works.”).
62 See Plaintiffs’ Motion and Memorandum of Law in Support of Summary Judgment at 7,
Disney Enters. v. Hotfile, Inc., No. 11-20427 (S.D. Fl. Mar. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Hotfile Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment] (describing the importance of direct linking to Hotfile’s Affiliate
Program, which allegedly induced infringement).
63 Id. at 4 n.1, (arguing that the fact that the lack of a “technological or business reason why
Hotfile does not have a search function on its own website . . . reflects Hotfile’s attempt to conceal, or
blind itself to, the rampant copyright infringement it fosters.”).
64 See Complaint at 5, Flava Works, Inc. v. Does 1-26, No. 12-cv-05844 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2012),
2012 WL 3096376 (alleging that rewards program satisfied direct financial benefit element of
contributory and inducement causes of action).
65 See Roger Parloff, Megaupload and the Twilight of Copyright, FORTUNE, July 23, 2012, at
131 (identifying password-protection as a feature that renders a system “poorly suited for mass
distribution of copyrighted materials.”).
66 Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Cyberlockers, File-Sharing, and Infringement in the
Cloud, LAW.COM (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?
id=1347193574468&thepage=1 (explaining that “rogue” cyberlockers function by providing a
publicly accessible link which can be accessed by way of third-party aggregators).
67 Hotfile Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 62, at 4.
68 Id.; “Hunger Games Mediafire” Search Results, GOOGLE.COM, http://www.google.com (search
“hunger games mediafire”) (last visited Nov. 8, 2012).

[12:205 2012]

Hotfile, Megaupload and the Future of Copyright on the
Internet: What can Cyberlockers Tell us About DMCA Reform?

217

infringing works on the system,69 but removing search functionality indicates an
effort to knowingly shield oneself from liability.70
Some cyberlockers also simply pay uploading users—based on the size of
uploaded files and the number of times those files are downloaded (“pay per
download” or “PPD”) or the number of premium memberships sold from the user’s
download pages (“pay per sale” or “PPS”).71
E. Hotfile and Megaupload
In light of the growing popularity of cyberlockers, many have drawn the ire of
copyright holders in recent years. Most recently, and most notably, the cyberlockers
Megaupload and Hotfile have met with litigation.
After its launch in 2005, Megaupload rose to a position of leadership in the
growing cyberlocker industry.72 On megaupload.com as well as various subsidiary
sites, the company offered a free storage service supported by advertising revenue as
well as a premium membership service for which they charged one-time fees based on
length of service.73
In January 2011, Perfect 10, a notoriously litigious adult entertainment
company, brought suit against Megaupload, alleging inter alia direct, contributory,
and vicarious copyright infringement.74 The parties to the lawsuit settled their
dispute early in the discovery process and the case was dismissed.75 This paper’s
69 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F. 3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing the
fact that Napster could have located infringing material listed on its search indices in holding
Napster liable for vicarious infringement).
70 Hotfile Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 62, at 4 n.1.
71 See, e.g. Earn, RAPIDGATOR, http://www.rapidgator.net/article/resource (follow “Pay per
download” and “Pay per sale” hyperlinks) (last visited Nov. 8, 2012) (detailing payout rates for its
PPD and PPS systems).
72 According to the web analytics firm Alexa Internet, Megaupload was the 73rd most popular
website in the world between 7/20/2010 and 10/20/2010. Megaupload.com Site Info, ALEXA.COM,
http://www.web.archive.org/web/web.php (accessed by searching for “megaupload” in the Internet
Archive index). Based on July 2011 data collected by Google, Megaupload was the second most
visited file sharing website in the world and the 91st most popular web site in the world. The 1000
Most-Visited Sites on the Web, GOOGLE.COM, http://www.google.com/adplanner/static/top1000 (last
visited Nov. 8, 2012). Its subsidiary, megavideo.com, was ranked 129th in overall popularity. Id.
73 Indictment at 4, United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12CR3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012).
Free
members were limited to 200 GB of storage at a maximum of 2 GB per file, and the frequency and
speed of their downloads was restricted. Difference Between Megaupload and Rapidshare,
http://www.differencebetween.net/technology/internet/differenceDIFFERENCEBETWEEN.NET,
between-megaupload-and-rapidshare/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2012). Premium users had access to
unlimited storage capacity, could download multiple files at the same time, and are subject to
substantially less advertising. Premium, MEGAUPLOAD, http://www.megaupload.com/?c=premium
(last visited Oct. 18, 2011) (currently unavailable due to domain seizure – screen-capture on file with
the John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law). The fees for premium service were
determined by the user’s selection of one of seven service plans- €3.99 for one day, €9.99 for one
month, and so on, up to €199.99 for a “lifetime platinum” membership. Id.
74 Complaint at 9–10, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload, Ltd., No. 11-cv-0191 (S.D. Cal. July 26,
2011), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81931 [hereinafter Megaupload Complaint].
75 Order Granting Joint Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice, Megaupload, No. 11-cv-0191 (Oct.
18, 2011).
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discussion of that case will focus on the district court’s July 2011 ruling on
Megaupload’s motion to dismiss.76 In January 2012, working in conjunction with law
enforcement authorities in eight countries, the Department of Justice shut down the
Megaupload sites and brought unprecedented criminal charges against Megaupload,
its subsidiaries, and seven key individuals involved in its operations.77 The
breathtaking indictment78 alleges criminal secondary infringement, a theory that has
not yet been tested in court.79
Hotfile is another popular cyberlocker in the mold of Megaupload.80 For its part,
it has been sued multiple times by copyright holders.81 In February 2011, a collection
of major motion picture studios sued Hotfile, alleging direct and secondary
infringement of their copyrights. 82
When a user uploads a file to the site, the user receives a unique download
link.83 The file can then be downloaded by anyone in possession of that download
link.84 Like Megaupload, Hotfile imposes use limits on unregistered and “free” users
and removes these limits for its premium users, who pay fees.85 The site includes an
intellectual property policy that complies fully with the DMCA.86 The complaint
Megaupload, No. 11-cv-0191.
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Dep’t Charges Leaders of Megaupload with
Widespread Online Copyright Infringement (Jan. 19, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2012/January/12-crm-074.html.
78 Indictment, United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12CR3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012).
79 See Nate Anderson, Government Admits Defeat, Gives Back Seized Rojadirecta Domains,
ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 29, 2012, 3:23 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/08/governmentgoes-0-2-admits-defeat-in-rojadirecta-domain-forfeit-case/. The Department of Justice recently
dismissed its own case alleging criminal secondary infringement against Puerto 80 Projects, owner
of a Spanish website that allowed users to post recordings and streams of sporting events. Id.
80 As of November 8, 2012, Alexa Internet ranked Hotfile 659th in global popularity using data
from the interval between August 8, 2012 and November 8, 2012. Hotfile.com: Site Info,
ALEXA.COM, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/hotfile.com (last visited Nov. 8, 2012). Hotfile’s ranking
and overall performance across various metrics has declined steadily and significantly in the wake
of its involvement in litigation. Id. Hotfile’s traffic rank, for example, has dropped from comfortably
within the top 200 most visited websites to its current position outside the top 600. Id. Graphs
indicating declines across seven different metrics can be accessed by clicking the “Traffic Stats” tab,
selecting the appropriate tab for each metric, and setting the time period to “Max.”
81 Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. Hotfile.com, No. 09-02396 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 16, 2009); Perfect
10, Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 10-02031 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2010); Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v.
Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20056 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 6, 2011);
82 Complaint at 8–11, Disney Enters., Inc. v. Hotfile Corp., No. 11-20427 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 8,
2011) [hereinafter Hotfile Complaint].
83 Terms of Service, HOTFILE, http://hotfile.com/terms-of-service.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2012).
84 Id.
85 Premium Member Program, HOTFILE, http://hotfile.com/premium.html (ast visited Nov. 8,
2012). Hotfile’s premium fees are also dependent on the user’s selection from three available service
plans- $9 for one month, $35 for six months, and $55 for one year. Id. All premium members receive
unlimited download access, and as the plans get more expensive a user is given a larger traffic
allowance for her hotlinks (she can allow non-users to download her files at premium speeds). Id.
86 Intellectual Property Policy, HOTFILE, http://hotfile.com/ippolicy.html (last visited Oct. 19,
2011). The policy also offers Special Rightsholder Accounts to copyright owners who “have given or
may be required to give repeated notifications” of infringing material. Id. These accounts allow the
owner to, in good faith, submit URLs for automatic takedown without having to complete a
sufficient notice for each instance of infringement. Id.
76
77
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focuses on four significant elements of Hotfile’s service: (1) the site gradually
increases payments to uploading users based on file size and number of downloads;87
(2) the site increases payments based on how broadly users disseminate their
download links;88 (3) the site pays third-party sites when a user follows a link from
the third-party site to a Hotfile-hosted download page, and, once there, signs up to be
a Hotfile premium member;89 and (4) the site includes statements which make plain
Hotfile’s intent to incentivize copyright infringement and dis-incentivize noninfringing use of its service.90

87 Complaint at 9–10, Hotfile, No. 11-20427. At the time of filing and for a substantial period
thereafter, the company paid uploading users each time one of their files was downloaded 1000
times by other users. Id.; see also First Amended Answer at 5–6, Hotfile, No. 11-20427 [hereinafter
Hotfile Amended Answer] (admitting these allegations in pertinent part). The rate paid for each
1000 downloads was increased with the size of the file and the “rank” of the user. Id. The user’s
rank was determined by two factors: “1. The ratio of the users that downloaded your files and the
users that become premium based on your uploaded files;” and “2. The ratio of uploaded files to
number of downloads.” Id. at 6.
The MPAA points out that based on this scheme, “a single uploaded file that is downloaded
50,000 times is more highly rewarded than 50 uploaded files downloaded 1,000 times each.”
Complaint at 9–10, Hotfile, No. 11-20427. It argues that by implementing this business plan,
Hotfile “incentivizes users to upload only highly popular works so as not to ‘waste’ Hotfile’s server
storage space with files that are not popular and not being downloaded by massive numbers of
users.” Id.
Interestingly, Hotfile has since changed its affiliate program to a pay per sale (PPS)
system—whereby users are paid according to how many downloaders purchase premium
subscriptions. Affiliate Program, HOTFILE, http://hotfile.com/affiliate.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2012).
88 Id. As the MPAA and studios argue, this scheme also disincentivizes non-infringing use of
the service. Because the ratio system is fluid, it penalizes users for uploading less popular files. Id.
at 10–11. Furthermore, Hotfile deletes files (of non-premium users) that have not been downloaded
in 90 days. Frequently Asked Questions, HOTFILE, http://hotfile.com/faq.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2012).
89 Affiliate Program, HOTFILE, http://web.archive.org/web/20110623181809/http://hotfile.com/
affiliate.html (accessed by searching “http://hotfile.com/affiliate.html” in the Internet Archive Index).
For site owners: Get 5% commission of all premium accounts sold through your
site. For every referrer that comes from your site and buys premium, you will get
5% of the account's price. No matter if download link is yours or you've found it
elsewhere! Post interesting download links in your site, blog or forum and earn
big money.
Id.; see also Hotfile Amended Answer, supra note 87, at 7. This language has since been deleted,
and Hotfile has changed its referral program, so that it only applies to individual users and not
third-party sites. Affiliate Program, supra note 89.
90 Hotfile Amended Answer, supra note 87, at 2.
Hotfile admits that at one time, the FAQ page of the hotfile.com website contained
the phrase ‘[u]pload files only if you intend to promote them’ and the Affiliate page
of the hotfile.com website contained the phrase ‘to encourage the good promoters
by increasing their earnings and to reduce the earnings for uploaders that
mainly use the free Hotfile resources for storage.’
Id. (emphasis added).
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II. ANALYSIS
In the wake of the Megaupload indictment, many important cyberlockers have
significantly altered or even shut down their services.91 Paradoxically, though, due
to a number of procedural issues beyond the scope of this Comment, as well as the
elevated burden that attends a criminal copyright infringement case, there is ample
room for skepticism that the case against Megaupload will be heard on the merits.92
Thus, the Hotfile case stands, at least in the view of some commentators, as an
especially significant test case for the legality of cyberlockers.93 Accordingly, this
section will use the facts, judicial opinions, and legal argument from these two cases
to analyze the status of cyberlockers under the currently applicable legal framework
introduced above.
A. Direct Infringement
In Perfect 10 v. Megaupload, the Southern District Court of California focused
its direct infringement analysis on three elements of Megaupload’s business plan
that were targeted in the complaint. First, the court inferred that the company’s use
of multiple websites represented an effort to “streamline users’ access to different
types of media.”94 Second, the court looked to Megaupload’s Rewards plan which, at
least according to the complaint, incentivized users to upload popular files (which are
more likely to infringe).95 Third, the court pointed to the allegation that Megaupload
paid affiliated websites who indexed its available files to make them available for
search.96 Finally, following Usenet,97 the court gave credence to Perfect 10’s
allegation that “at a minimum, [Megaupload] is plausibly aware of the ongoing,

91 See, e.g., enigmax, FileServe and Wupload Exit the File-Sharing Business, TORRENTFREAK
(Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.torrentfreak.com/fileserve-and-wupload-exit-the-file-sharing-business120403/. In addition to the Megaupload indictment, an Australian pornographer operating the
website “stopfilelockers.com” has undertaken a fairly successful effort to convince payment systems
to cut off services to many cyberlockers. STOPFILELOCKERS, http://www.stopfilelockers.com (last
visited Dec. 2, 2012); enigmax, 90 Days of Killing Cyberlockers: 50 Dead, More Than 500 Injured,
TORRENTFREAK (Oct. 6, 2012), http://www.torrentfreak.com/90-days-of-killing-cyberlockers-50-deadmore-than-500-injured-121006/.
92 See generally Eriq Gardner, Megaupload Judge Says He Doesn’t Know if There Will Ever be a
Trial, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Apr. 20, 2012, 6:38 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thresq/megaupload-trial-kim-dotcom-314657 (surveying the myriad complicating issues involved in the
case).
93 See Terrence Hart, Copyright Liability for Filelockers: Disney v. Hotfile, COPYHYPE (Aug. 20,
2012), http://www.copyhype.com/2012/08/copyright-liability-for-filelockers-disney-v-hotfile/ (noting
that the case “may prove influential in shaping copyright law online”).
94 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload, Ltd., No. 11-cv-0191 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2011), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 81931 .
95 Id. at 7; see also Complaint, Megaupload, No. 11-cv-0191, at 6–7.
96 Complaint, supra note 95, at 7.
97 Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, 633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Recall that the
court in Usenet denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the direct infringement claim because the
defendant’s online message board dedicated servers specifically to facilitate upload/download of mp3
files, was aware that its service was being used to exchange infringing files. Id.
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rampant infringement taking place on its websites.”98 Though the court’s analysis
appears to establish the elements of contributory rather than direct infringement, it
found this reasoning sufficient to justify denial of Megaupload’s motion to dismiss.99
Conversely, in Hotfile, the court adhered to a conventional interpretation of the
Netcom standard, attacking the Usenet reasoning which would later be adopted by
the Megaupload court.100 The court argued that such reasoning “ignores the
language of Netcom and other cases following Netcom. As the Fourth Circuit put it,
‘knowledge coupled with inducement,’ or ‘supervision coupled with a financial
interest in the illegal copying’ gives rise to secondary liability, not directinfringement liability.”101
The Netcom rule is malleable, and cyberlocker cases give judges excellent
opportunities to manipulate it. Just as the material contribution test in contributory
infringement has been relaxed by the courts,102 so too the volitional requirement may
be expanded to impose liability according to the conviction of the court. Now that the
broad interpretation that Usenet extrapolated from Russ Hardenburgh seems to be
gaining some traction, some uncertainty has been introduced.103 It is important to
note, however, that the recent trend consists entirely of district court decisions, and
that the practical efficacy of the Netcom approach counsels in favor of retaining that
rule in spite of the theoretical weaknesses this new wave of opinions has exploited.
B. Contributory Infringement
In the Megaupload case, the Defendant argued that the Plaintiffs had failed to
adequately allege (1) the underlying direct infringement, (2) that Megaupload had
specific knowledge of the underlying infringement (if any did in fact occur), and (3)
that Megaupload had the right and ability to control any infringing conduct.104 The
defendant did not dispute the allegation that (assuming infringement occurred) it
materially contributed to its users’ direct infringement.105

Megaupload, No. 11-cv-0191, at 7.
Id.
100 Hotfile, No. 11-20427, at 6.
101 Id. (quoting CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004)).
102 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
103 Eric Goldman, Catching up on Four Months of Copyright Cases:
Myxer, Hotfile,
Megaupload, Flava Works, Zediva, Blue Nile, Perfect 10, Rojadirecta. ERIC GOLDMAN TECH. &
MARKETING L. BLOG (Aug. 12, 2011), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/08/
catching_up_on.htm (“The fact is that all but the most passive of hosts or conduits take some
affirmative steps towards customizing the downloader's experience, and trying to parse which of
those steps constitute "volitional" conduct and which don't is leading to the inevitable doctrinal
incoherence.”).
104 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant Megaupload LLC’s Motion
to Dismiss at 4–6, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload, LLC, No. 11-cv-0191 (S.D. Cal. July 26, 2011)
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81931. Megaupload argued for application of a strict, “actual knowledge of
specific instances of infringement standard.” Id. at 5 (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc, 508
F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011).
105 Megaupload, No. 11-cv-0191 at 9.
98
99
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The court declined to impose a strict specific knowledge standard at the motion
to dismiss stage.106 Noting that a takedown notice, standing alone, may not
represent sufficient evidence of knowledge, the court pointed to the various features
of Megaupload’s business plan107 that supported a “plausible inference of
knowledge,”108 to the extent that “if Megaupload lacks knowledge of infringing
activity, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest such lack of knowledge is willful.”109
In possession of a much clearer record, the Hotfile court held that the Studios’
allegations regarding the nature of Hotfile’s business plan were sufficient to survive
a motion to dismiss.110
The Hotfile Plaintiffs contend in their Motion for Summary Judgment that, since
for DMCA purposes Defendants had actual knowledge, red flag knowledge, or willful
blindness with respect to the infringement occurring on their service, a fortiori they
had knowledge sufficient to justify a finding of contributory infringement.111 This
conclusion is founded on the proposition, supported by a citation to five cases, that a
plaintiff need not demonstrate that a contributory infringer had actual knowledge,
but merely that the defendant “‘had reason to know’ of the infringing activity.”112
For their part, the Defendants argue initially that they are entitled to the Sony
exemption from liability, as their service is capable of substantial non-infringing
uses.113 On the strength of its current and potential non-infringing uses, Defendants
maintain, Hotfile should be absolved from liability.114 In the event that they are not
entitled to Sony protection, Defendants claim that they are not contributory
infringers because there is no evidence that Hotfile had actual knowledge of any
specific files, and directly rebut Plaintiffs’ assertion that actual knowledge is not
required with their own five-case string citation.115
The proper interpretation of the Napster case is at the center of the parties’
dispute. Defendants contend that Napster “is the seminal cases (sic.) establishing the
‘actual knowledge’ standard.’”116 But Plaintiffs cite to Napster for the proposition
that a contributory infringer need only “know or have reason to know” of the
106 The court quotes the same standard from Amazon relied on by Megaupload in its Motion,
but arguably proceeds to adopt a looser, constructive knowledge standard. Id. at 8. Such an
approach is likely appropriate at the motion to dismiss stage and in light of the particular facts of
this case.
107 See supra notes 94–107 and accompanying text.
108 Megaupload, No. 11-cv-0191, at 9.
109 Id.; see also In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Willful
blindness is knowledge”).
110 Disney Enters. v. Hotfile, 798 F. Supp. 2d 1303, 1310–11 (S.D. Fl. 2011). As in Megaupload,
the court was willing to accept evidence of constructive knowledge at the motion to dismiss stage.
Id.
111 Hotfile Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 62, at 33.
112 Id. (quoting Cable/Home Comm. Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 846 (11th Cir.
1990)).
113 Memorandum of Law of Defendants in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment at 28–30, Hotfile, No. 11-20427 (S.D. Fl. Mar. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Hotfile Defendants’
Opposition Memorandum]. Defendants point out that their service can be and is used for
distribution open-source software, for personal storage, for sharing Creative Commons-licensed
films, and for distribution of public domain material. Id. at 28–29.
114 Id. at 29.
115 Id. at 31.
116 Id.
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infringing activity.117 So which is it? The situation is confused by the fact that the
court in Napster found that there was a factual basis for actual knowledge of specific
infringement,118 but a close reading of Napster nevertheless supports the Plaintiffs’
case more strongly.
There, the court opened its contributory infringement analysis with the
statement of law quoted in Plaintiffs’ Motion.119 It expressed its holding on the issue
as follows: “the evidentiary record here supported the district court’s finding that
plaintiffs would likely prevail in establishing that Napster knew or had reason to
know of its users’ infringement . . . .”120 Importantly, the court distinguished
between the structure of Napster’s system and the nature of Napster’s conduct.121
Hotfile emphasizes the court’s assertion that “absent any specific information which
identifies infringing activity, a computer system operator cannot be liable for
contributory infringement merely because the structure of the system allows for the
exchange of copyrighted material.”122 But this statement, read in context, necessarily
leaves room for constructive knowledge to satisfy the knowledge requirement. That
is, the court did not state a binary—that a system operator is liable when it has
actual knowledge, and not liable when it does not have actual knowledge. Rather,
the court declared that, absent any specific information identifying infringement, the
operator may not be held liable on account of the structure of her system.123 That
language leaves open a third scenario—where the host lacks specific identifying
knowledge, but has operated its system in such a way as to justify a finding that it
should have known of the infringing activity. This reading is consistent with the
initial statements of the knowledge requirement in both the Napster and Netcom
cases; statements which were not abandoned by either court.124
C. Vicarious Liability
In Megaupload, the court followed the Visa court’s formulation of “right and
ability to control.”125 Since anyone with the appropriate URL could download an
infringing file from its site, the court reasoned, Megaupload did not have the right

Hotfile Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 62, at 33.
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022 (9th Cir. 2001).
119 Id. at 1020.
120 Id. at 1021
121 Id. at 1020 (“We are compelled to make a clear distinction between the architecture of the
Napster system and Napster’s conduct in relation to the operational capacity of the system.”).
122 Id. at 1021; Hotfile Defendants’ Opposition Memorandum, supra note 113, at 31–32.
123 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
124 Id. at 1020; Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373–74 (N.D. Cal.
1995) (framing issue as whether Defendant knew or should have known of the infringement).
125 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload, Ltd., No. 11-cv-0191, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81931, at *18
(S.D. Cal. July 26, 2011) (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 805 (9th
Cir. 2007)) (“For vicarious liability to attach . . . the defendant must have the right and ability to
supervise and control the infringement, not just affect it . . . .”). See also the discussion of the Visa
case at supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text.
117
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and ability to supervise and control the infringement.126 The court therefore
dismissed the vicarious infringement claim.127
Conversely, the Hotfile court expressly found that Hotfile “had the technology
necessary to stop this type of infringement,” and therefore had the right and ability
to supervise and control the infringement.128 The different outcome from Megaupload
was likely caused by a difference in the complaints—while the Film Studios alleged
that Hotfile had adequate tools to stop downloads even by unregistered users, Perfect
10 made no such allegation.129
On Summary Judgment in Hotfile, the Plaintiffs argue that Defendants had the
right and ability to unilaterally terminate, suspend, or restrict subscriptions, that
they substantially declined to exercise that right, and that the copyrighted content on
Hotfile served as a “draw” to consumers.130 In their Response, Defendants argue that
Hotfile cannot practically determine what on their systems is infringing, and point
out that Hotfile has no searchable index, that Hotfile users did not have to give their
files accurate names like the users in Napster, and that “‘the system architecture’ of
Hotfile is not set up to provide Hotfile with the ability to supervise infringing
conduct.”131 But, as mentioned above, the gap in search functionality left by Hotfile’s
strategic decision to leave it out of their site was/is filled by third-party
aggregators,132 in part due to Hotfile’s now-abandoned practice of offering and
making payments to such aggregators.133 Further, since uploader-affiliate payments
were/are driven by the amount of traffic an uploader lures to her download link, the
uploader has a stronger incentive to provide accurate file names (cash),134 than the
users in Napster, who were merely motivated by a practical collective interest in files
being searchable.135 Additionally, Hotfile’s argument that the architecture of its
system does not provide it with the ability to supervise infringing conduct likely
triggers the willful blindness doctrine,136 to be discussed more fully infra.
D. Inducement Liability
Perfect 10 did not bring a separate claim for inducement, and the Grokster case
is not cited in Megaupload.137 The Hotfile court cursorily held the allegations that

Megaupload, No. 11-cv-0191, at 18.
Id.
128 Hotfile, 798 F. Supp. 2d 1303, at 1310–11.
129 Compare Megaupload Complaint, supra note 74, with Hotfile Complaint, supra note 82, at
¶23. Without any analysis, the court held that the Studios had adequately alleged that Hotfile
profited directly from its failure to exercise its right and ability to control the infringement. Hotfile,
798 F. Supp. 2d at 1310.
130 Hotfile Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 62, at 34–35.
131 Hotfile Defendants’ Opposition Memorandum, supra note 113, at 32.
132 See, e.g., About, FILESTUBE, www.filestube.com/about.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2012).
133 See discussion of Hotfile’s referral program at supra note 89.
134 See explanation of Hotfile’s current and past affiliate programs at supra note 90.
135 A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001).
136 See infra notes 182–185 and accompanying text.
137 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., No. 11-cv-0191, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81931 (S.D. Cal.
2011).
126
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Hotfile had created a “structured business model that encourages users to commit
copyright infringement” sufficient to state a claim for infringement by inducement.138
Much of the 72-page indictment against Megaupload is aimed at establishing an
inducement-like cause of action—namely, conspiracy to commit willful
infringement.139 In light of the high standard it must meet, the government provides
an instructive array of facts which would be significant in establishing an
inducement claim. These facts include, to name a few: internal e-mails indicating
that Megaupload officials knew that certain uploaders were engaging infringement,
and made reward payments to them anyway;140 internal e-mails transmitting
infringing Megaupload links between employees;141 an internal e-mail instructing
employees to ignore large takedown requests unless they come from major sources in
the United States, in order to preserve revenue;142 an e-mail from a third-party
advertiser cutting off services which specifically identified infringing Megaupload
links;143 and claims (likely, although not necessarily, supported by screenshot
evidence) that specific films and software programs were made publicly available
through Megaupload, in some cases at or before their authorized release dates.144
The Hotfile Plaintiffs cannot match the evidentiary heft amassed by the U.S.
Government, but their case nonetheless has persuasive potential, depending on your
view of the facts. Their inducement argument focuses once again on the affiliate
program, arguing that Hotfile expressly incentivizes conduct that is more likely to
infringe copyrights, while disincentivizing conduct that is less likely to infringe.145
Plaintiffs also cite to a third-party statement to the effect that Hotfile has a
reputation for not suspending or subtracting credits from uploaders that are
repeatedly accused of infringement.146 Further, they claim that Hotfile is used
chiefly for infringement, citing a study that found over 90% of downloads were
infringing.147
The Plaintiffs even attempt to piggyback on the Megaupload
indictment, contending that “defendants modeled Hotfile’s business after
Megaupload.”148 Additionally, Plaintiffs point out that the Defendants offered
technical assistance to users they knew were seeking to infringe copyrights,149 and
refused to implement technology to prevent infringement.150
Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ claims on the facts: they argue that the majority
of uploads to the site are non-infringing,151 that not one of the Studios’ works cracks
the top 100 downloads on Hotfile,152 and that the Plaintiffs’ analysis misleadingly

Hotfile, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78387, at *6.
See Indictment at 24–52, United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12CR3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012).
140 Id. at 32–33.
141 Id. at 31, 35.
142 Id. at 40.
143 Id. at 34.
144 Id. at 48–50, 52.
145 Hotfile Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 62, at 30.
146 Id. at 30–31.
147 Id. at 31.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 32.
150 Id.
151 Hotfile Defendants’ Opposition Memorandum, supra note 113, at 7.
152 Id.
138
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considers only downloads and not all uses of the site.153 Disclaiming any association
with Megaupload, the Defendants claim they modeled their service after Rapidshare,
a previously controversial but recently reformed cyberlocker.154 Hotfile claims that it
has taken substantial steps to deter infringement, and that these actions bring it
outside of the Grokster holding.155
There is little disagreement among the parties as to the legal standard
applicable to the inducement claim—each side’s argument largely follows the factors
set out in Grokster and marshals the facts to support its claims.156 Nonetheless,
pinning down how a court will weigh the factors relevant to an adjudication of
inducement, and how it will interpret the relationship between inducement liability
and safe harbor eligibility, remains difficult.157
E. Safe Harbor Eligibility158
1. Repeat Infringer Policy
Recall that a service provider asserting safe harbor protection as a defense to an
infringement claim must first show that it has implemented “a policy that provides
for the termination in appropriate circumstances of . . . repeat infringers.”159 This
provision is exceedingly vague and raises at least two important issues: (1) what are
appropriate circumstances? And (2) if a service provider is under no duty to
monitor,160 what steps can it be required to take to determine the identities of repeat
infringers?
The Hotfile Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants failed to implement a
“meaningful policy to terminate repeat infringers.”161 They note that Hotfile did not
cross-reference infringement notices with the uploaders of the noticed files, and did
not investigate nor keep track of such users.162 Further, they use Hotfile’s data to
quantify how many users accrued 10, 25, 100, or even 300 or more takedown notices

Id.
Id. at 24.
155 Id. at 24–25.
156 Compare Hotfile Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 62, at 29–33, with
Hotfile Defendants’ Opposition Memorandum, supra note 113, at 23–28.
157 See 6 PATRY, supra note 19, § 21.79 (arguing that the scope of Grokster inducement liability
is indeterminate, and noting a dearth of, and need for, cases which address and develop the theory).
158 Because Megaupload never got a chance to assert a safe harbor defense in the Perfect 10
lawsuit, and because the question whether the DMCA applies to criminal copyright infringement is
complex, novel, and beyond the scope of this Comment, the safe harbor discussion will largely
confine itself to the summary judgment briefs in Hotfile as well as relevant recent case law.
Additionally, § 512(c)(2) conditions eligibility on the service provider’s appointment of a registered
agent. This Comment eschews analysis of that provision as it raises a pure issue of fact.
159 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2012).
160 17 U.S.C. § 512(m).
161 Hotfile Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 62, at 19–22.
162 Id. at 19–20.
153
154
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without getting terminated, and estimate that Hotfile paid these users over $10.8
million.163
The Defendants admit to documenting only “over 40” terminations from 20092011, but respond that the statutory requirement is flexible, that takedown notices
are allegations rather than clear indications of infringement, that a “large
proportion” of the notices they received were improper, and that Hotfile “continually
and proactively strengthen[ed] its policies in response to content owner requests,
evolving technology and market shifts.”164
A consensus appears to be building around the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of
the § 512(i)(1)(A) requirement in Perfect 10 v. CCBill.165 There, the court held that a
service provider would meet the requirement if it “has a working notification system,
a procedure for dealing with DMCA-compliant notifications, and if it does not actively
prevent copyright owners from collecting information needed to issue such
notifications.”166
It appears that Hotfile had a procedure for dealing with DMCA-compliant
notifications, and that it did not actively hinder content owners from obtaining
necessary information.
However, Hotfile admits that from 2009-2011, its
termination policy was to wait to terminate until a copyright owner sufficiently
identified a blatant repeat infringer as such.167 Significantly, it did not keep track of
the users that uploaded noticed files.168 The court in CCBill contemplated that “a
substantial failure to record webmasters associated with allegedly infringing
websites may raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the implementation of the
service provider’s repeat infringer policy.”169 Does OCILLA require a content owner
both to notify the service provider of specific infringing uses, and to track its notices
by user so that it can submit evidence of repeat infringers to the service provider? Or
does the § 512(i)(1)(A) requirement place this second obligation – to associate user
data with notice data in order to detect repeat infringers – on the service provider?
2. Knowledge
The three-part knowledge requirement is the next hurdle for a webhost
asserting safe harbor protection.170 In Hotfile, the Plaintiffs concede that Hotfile
responded expeditiously to proper notices of infringement, leaving only actual and
“red flag” knowledge in dispute.171 They make three arguments for their claim that

163 Id. at 20. Because the publicly available version of their Motion is redacted, the specific
numbers of such users are unavailable at this time.
164 Hotfile Defendants’ Opposition Memorandum, supra note 113, at 10–13.
165 Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109–11 (9th Cir. 2007); see also UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 665 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1117 (9th Cir. 2009); Capitol Records,
Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 821 F.Supp.2d 627, 637–38 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
166 CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1109.
167 Hotfile Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 62, at 11.
168 Id. at 11–12.
169 488 F.3d at 1110.
170 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2012).
171 See Hotfile Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 62, at 24–27. Plaintiffs’
discussion of the knowledge requirement omits the expeditious response provision entirely. Id.
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the Defendants had actual knowledge: (1) that, from February to August 2009,
Hotfile took down only noticed URLs rather than removing the underlying files from
its servers;172 (2) that service messages from users to Hotfile staff included the
download link of the last file the user downloaded-often comprising a word-for-word
title of a copyrighted work;173 and (3) that Hotfile staff actively assisted users in
downloading files with “unmistakably infringing titles.”174
The Defendants respond that the use of a given file at one URL may be
infringing while its use at another would not be.175 Further, they argue that any
knowledge they had of file names is irrelevant because file names do not serve as an
accurate proxy for infringement.176
In Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc, an important recent case determining
eligibility for the § 512(c) safe harbor, the Second Circuit distinguished
§ 512(c)(1)(A)(i) from § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) as follows: “the actual knowledge provision
turns on whether the provider actually or ‘subjectively’ knew of specific infringement,
while the red flag provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively aware of
facts that would have made the specific infringement ‘objectively’ obvious to a
reasonable person.”177 This analysis constitutes a departure (though not a wholly
drastic one) from a line of cases which had essentially read the red flag provision out
of the statute on the basis of legislative history and practical considerations.178
Though the chances that a service provider will be denied safe harbor protection on a
finding of red flag knowledge are still vanishingly small,179 the courts in Viacom and
Shelter Capital, a recent Ninth Circuit case, have provided two narrow ways a
plaintiff could satisfy § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii): First, in Shelter Capital, the court suggested
in a footnote that a third-party notification of a certain type might constitute a red
flag.180 Second, in Viacom, the court held that certain internal e-mails which
Hotfile Defendants’ Opposition Memorandum, supra note 113, at 15.
Hotfile Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 62, at 24–25.
174 Id. at 25.
175 Hotfile Defendants’ Opposition Memorandum, supra note 113, at 16.
176 Id.
177 676 F.3d 19, 31 (2d Cir. 2012).
178 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F.3d 1022, 1037 (9th Cir. 2011)
(holding Defendant webhost’s “general knowledge that it hosted copyrightable material and that its
services could be used for infringement . . . insufficient to constitute a red flag.”); Capitol Records,
Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 644–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Io Grp., Inc. v Veoh Networks,
Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148–49 (N.D. Cal. 2008); 3 NIMMER, supra note 13, § 12B.04[A][1]
(quoting the House Commerce Committee Report, H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(II) at 54 (1998)). But see 6
PATRY, supra note 19, § 21:85. Professor Patry contrasts the oft-quoted portion of House Commerce
Committee Report with a passage from the House Judiciary Committee Report which posits that the
§ 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) exemption applies as soon as a service provider becomes aware of “information of
any kind that a reasonable person would rely upon.” Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 105-551(I), at 25 (1998).
179 3 NIMMER, supra note 13, § 12B.04[A][1] (stating that even a “blood crimson” flag would not
require investigation or trigger imposition of liability).
180 667 F.3d at 1040 n.14.
A user email informing Veoh of infringing material and specifying its location
provides a good example of the distinction [between actual and red flag
knowledge]. Although the user's allegations would not give Veoh actual knowledge
under § 512(c)(1)(A)(i), because Veoh would have no assurance that a third party
who does not hold the copyright in question could know whether the material was
infringing, the email could act as a red flag under § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) provided its
information was sufficiently specific.
172
173
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identified specific infringing works raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
YouTube’s knowledge both actual and red flag.181
3. Willful Blindness
The murky domain of the § 512(c) safe harbor is further clouded by the willful
blindness doctrine—which deems that a person has actual knowledge if he
“subjectively believe[s] that there is a high probability that a fact exists,” and takes
“deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.”182 Though the Supreme Court has
not yet had occasion to apply the willful blindness doctrine in a copyright case,183 the
latest Court of Appeals to speak on the issue—the Second Circuit in Viacom—held
expressly that “the willful blindness doctrine may be applied, in appropriate
circumstances, to demonstrate knowledge or awareness of specific instances of
infringement under the DMCA.”184
4. Financial Benefit, Right and Ability to Control
Finally, a service provider seeking safe harbor must show that it does not
receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in
which [it] has the right and ability to control such activity.”185 Here, again, the
Viacom and Shelter Capital decisions are instructive. The district court that heard
the Viacom case held that “[t]he ‘right and ability to control’ the activity requires
knowledge of it, which must be item-specific.”186 The Ninth Circuit endorsed this
view in Shelter Capital, stating that “a service provider may, as a general matter,
have the legal right and necessary technology to remove infringing content, but until
it becomes aware of specific unauthorized material, it cannot exercise its ‘power or
authority’ over the specific infringing item.”187 Significantly, the Second Circuit
departed from this reasoning in Viacom, noting that making specific knowledge an
element of the right and ability to control requirement renders § 512(c)(1)(B)
duplicative of § 512(c)(1)(A).188 But the court offered little guidance to replace the
rule it discarded, indicating only that a violation of § 512(c)(1)(B) would likely
“involve a service provider exerting substantial influence on the activities of users,

Id.

676 F.3d at 33–34.
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011) (applying the willful
blindness doctrine to a patent infringement case).
183 In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2006), the Court
declined to resolve a conflict between the Ninth and Seventh Circuits with regard to this issue,
instead ruling that the evidence in that case supported a finding of actual knowledge. Global-Tech,
131 S. Ct. at 2070.
184 676 F.3d 19, 40 (2d Cir. 2012).
185 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2012).
186 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527.
187 667 F.3d 1042.
188 676 F.3d at 36.
181
182
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without necessarily—or even frequently—acquiring knowledge of specific infringing
activity.”189
Curiously, the Hotfile Plaintiffs did not argue this point in their Motion for
Summary Judgment.190
F. Summary: The Current System
One can distill several problems with the current liability scheme from the
above cases in the cyberlocker context, and more generally from the case law in the
field. The scope of a service provider’s liability for secondary infringement,191 and to
a lesser extent, for direct infringement,192 is unclear and defined by manipulable
standards. The limits of the safe harbor provided by § 512(c) are similarly
muddled.193 Furthermore, the structure and practice of the notice and takedown
system gives counterproductive incentives to all parties:
Service providers are discouraged from filtering uploaded content prior to
notification of infringement,194 and directed to take down whatever a copyright owner
decides is infringing, with little practical safeguards for users’ interests.195
Copyright owners, assured of cooperation and aware that the consequences of
misuse on their part are negligible,196 have every incentive to exploit the procedure in
an overprotective manner.197

Id. at 47–48.
Hotfile Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 62, at 19–27. The Plaintiffs’
OCILLA argument does not include any analysis of the financial benefit/right and ability to control
provision. Id.
191 See Lital Helman, Pull Too Hard and the Rope May Break: On the Secondary Liability of
Technology Providers for Copyright Infringement, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 111, 131 (2010) (“The
open-ended nature of the secondary liability standard renders it difficult, if not impossible, to
predict the results of future cases or even the theories upon which they would be decided.”).
192 See supra notes 13–18, 94–105 and accompanying text.
193 Compare Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 96 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1620 (C.D. Cal.
2009) (holding, in a case where the defendant did not have a viable safe harbor defense, that an
online service that meets the Grokster standard may not assert a safe harbor defense), with Viacom
Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (distinguishing Fung and
holding that Grokster inducement does not apply to cases where safe harbor protection is
warranted).
194 See Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 525. Since complying with the statutory requirements after
notification exempts a webhost from liability, there is arguably little incentive to incur the cost of
filtering. Id. Furthermore, filtering may be an indication of ability to control infringement,
exempting the service provider from safe harbor protection under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B). Tur v.
Youtube, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50254 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2007) (“the requirement presupposes
some antecedent ability to limit or filter copyrighted material”). But see Ginsburg, supra note 6, at
587 (arguing that sites may have an interest in filtering to promote the perception of legitimacy) and
Tim Wu, The Copyright Paradox, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 229, 247 (contending that under Grokster,
filtering may give rise to a presumption of intent not to induce).
195 See Edward Lee, Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 233, 234–35
(2009). Again, since complying with the statutory requirements exempts the host from liability, it
has a strong incentive to take down whatever material is referenced in the notice without taking the
time to assess whether the copyright is in fact owned by the party giving notice or whether the
material does in fact infringe.
189
190
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Copyright owners have complete information about the files being infringed and
a direct interest in protecting against infringement, while service providers have
greater access to and control over uploaded files. Congress intended OCILLA to
serve as a compromise between these two principal categories of stakeholders, but in
the context of cyberlockers and other § 512(c) technologies, the current system
saddles copyright owners with a disproportionate share of the burden to enforce the
copyright law.

III. PROPOSAL
With these problems in mind, commentators, legislators, and industry
stakeholders have proposed numerous alternative methods of promoting responsible
copyright enforcement without encroaching on free speech rights or the free flow of
information. This section will survey four such proposals and argue for a solution
that incorporates aspects of each of them.
A. The “Follow the Money” Approach
Both Houses of Congress recently considered legislation to regulate digital
piracy.198 The Protect IP Act (PIPA), introduced in the Senate in May 2011, and the
Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), introduced in the House of Representatives in
October 2011, would have left the current liability system intact, but attempted to
improve enforcement by providing additional remedies to content owners and to the
Attorney General.199
Under the bills, if a court determined that a site was dedicated to infringement,
it could have ordered: (1) internet service providers to block public access to the site;
(2) payment system providers to suspend or terminate service to the site; (3)
advertising services to suspend or terminate service to the site; and (4) search
engines to disable links to the site.200 In both bills, the first (and most drastic) of
these restrictions was only applicable to foreign sites that did business in the U.S.,
196 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156–57 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (holding
copyright owner liable under 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) for misusing the takedown procedure by issuing a
takedown notice without considering whether the uploaded material had a fair use defense, but
anticipating that damages would be nominal).
197 See Megaupload, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81931 at *14–15 (describing Perfect 10’s
submission of 22 takedown notices, only one of which actually referred to material for which it
owned the copyright); MP3Tunes, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93351 at *14 (discussing a takedown notice
sent by EMI requesting removal of all EMI copyrighted works based on the “representative list” it
had provided).
198 Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property
Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong.; Stop Online Piracy Act of 2011, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong.
199 H.R. 3261 § 2(a)(2) (“Nothing in Title I [which includes §§ 102 and 103] shall be construed to
enlarge or diminish liability, including vicarious or contributory liability, for any cause of action
available under title 17, United States Code, including any limitations on liability under such
title.”); see also Terrence Hart, SOPA: New Remedies for Existing Liability, COPYHYPE (Nov. 14,
2011) http://www.copyhype.com/2011/11/sopa-new-remedies-for-existing-liability/.
200 S. 968 §§ 3–4; H.R. 3261 §§ 102–103.
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and could only be sought in an action by the Attorney General.201 Though that
element of the legislation was heavily backed by the content industry,202 it was
abandoned prior to the online protests; the bills that were eventually tabled included
only the last three, more indirect measures.203
As noted above, the requirements for establishing liability under the bills
tracked those of existing secondary liability law. In its final form, SOPA provided
two definitions of the term “site dedicated to theft of U.S. Property:”204 (1) the site is
primarily designed, operated, or marketed for, or has “only limited purpose or use
other than” copyright and/or trademark infringement;205 or (2) the operator of the site
“promotes its use” for infringement.206 The first definition can be characterized as a
stronger version of the Sony standard, and the second as a codification of Grokster.207
201 S. 968 §§ 2(9), 3; H.R. 3261 § 102.
There is much debate as to whether the collateral
negative consequences (chiefly due process, free speech, and national reputation concerns) of
Domain Name System (DNS) filtering outweigh its potential effectiveness. Compare Mark A.
Lemley, David S. Levine & David G. Post, Don't Break the Internet (Jan. 3, 2012), 64 STANFORD L.
REV. ONLINE 34, Dec. 2011., available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1978989 (positing that DNS
filtering is ineffective and would result in significant and pervasive collateral damage), with George
Ou, My Filtering Research Before the House SOPA Panel, HIGH TECH F. (Dec. 16, 2011),
http://www.hightechforum.org/my-dns-filtering-research-before-house-sopa-panel/
(rebutting
arguments that DNS filtering would harm DNSSEC, and arguing that filtering would target piracy
with limited collateral damage).
202 Michael O’Leary, News Release, Motion Picture Association of America (Jan. 12, 2012)
available at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/2012/01/olearystatement.pdf (“We
continue to believe that DNS filtering is an important tool, already used in numerous countries
internationally to protect consumers and the intellectual property of businesses with targeted filters
for rogue sites”).
203 Eric Engleman, Leahy Floats Change to Senate Version of Hollywood-Backed Anti-Piracy
Bill, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 13, 2012) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-12/senator-leahyproposes-change-to-hollywood-backed-anti-piracy-measure.html (reporting that a key sponsor of the
Protect IP Act planned to propose an amendment requiring the DNS filtering provision “to be
studied before it is implemented”); News Release, Office of Congressman Lamar Smith (Jan. 13,
2012), http://judiciary.house.gov/news/DNS%20blocking%20SOPA.html (“[Lamar Smith, the
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee] feel[s] we should remove Domain Name System
blocking from the Stop Online Piracy Act so that the Committee can further examine the issues
surrounding this provision.”).
204 A December Manager’s Amendment eliminated a third definition that was present in the
original bill. Compare H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 103(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I) (as introduced, October 26, 2011),
with H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 103(a)(1)(C)(ii) (as amended, December 12, 2011). This third
definition essentially codified the willful blindness doctrine most notably applied in the context of
digital copyright law by the Seventh Circuit in the Aimster case. 334 F.3d 643, 650 (2003).
205 H.R. 3261 § 103(a)(1)(C)(i).
the site is primarily designed or operated for the purpose of, has only limited
purpose or use other than, or is marketed by its operator or another acting in
concert with that operator primarily for use in, offering goods or services in
violation of [in pertinent part, 17 U.S.C. § 501 which covers civil infringement of
copyright].
Id.
206 Id. at § 103(a)(1)(C)(ii) (“[T]he operator of the site operates the site with the object of
promoting, or has promoted, its use to carry out acts that constitute a [copyright infringement], as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster such violation”).
207 Hart, supra note 199; compare Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (“capable of commercially significant
non-infringing use”), with Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 491 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[I]f a significant
portion of the product’s use is noninfringing, the manufacturers and sellers cannot be held
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In a recent working paper, Professor David G. Robinson argues from successful
use of intermediary regulations in several analogous contexts that such measures
would have similar success if applied to digital copyright and trademark piracy.208 In
particular, Professor Robinson cites the success of the payment system provisions of
the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA)209 as indicating
that similar provisions would likely work in the copyright context.210 But there are
key differences between internet gambling and online copyright infringement that
weaken this argument.211
While SOPA/PIPA would enhance enforcement of
copyright law against the most egregious offenders (the bills’ principal targets), in
close cases like MP3Tunes they would suffer from the same infirmities as the existing
system.
B. Graduated Response
Faced with high costs and uncertain outcomes when litigating against service
providers, a public relations nightmare when litigating against users, and an
inability to secure legislative amendments to the DMCA, the content industry has
shifted in recent years to a strategy termed “graduated response.”212 This approach
contributorily liable for the product’s infringing uses.”) (emphasis in original); see also Grokster, 545
U.S. 913, 936–37 (“[O]ne who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is
liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties”).
208 David G. Robinson, Following the Money: A Better Way Forward on the Protect IP Act (Sept.
18, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1930013.
Professor
Robinson surveys the success of both voluntary and legally compelled actions taken by payment
service providers against illegal online tobacco sales, child pornography, online pharmacies, and
internet gambling. Id. at 16–18.
209 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361–67 (2012).
210 Id. § 5364; Robinson, supra note 208, at 18–19.
Estimates suggest that the UIGEA
decreased the value of online casino gambling businesses by up to 80 percent. Id. at 19.
211 The UIGEA requires financial institutions to maintain the coding and blocking systems
most of them had in place prior to the act. 31 U.S.C. § 5364(c). These systems are based on the
merchant category code—each business tags its credit card sales with a four-digit code that
represents the category of good or service sold. Mark MacCarthy, What Payment Intermediaries are
Doing About Online Liability and Why it Matters, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1037, 1062–65 (2010).
Gambling has its own code, and internet transactions are marked with an electronic commerce
indicator, so a financial institution simply blocks transactions marked with both the code and the
indicator in jurisdictions that don’t allow internet gambling, and processes such transactions as
normal in jurisdictions that permit internet gambling. Id. at 1062–1063. Further, the institutions
routinely run test transactions to ensure that merchants are properly coding. Id. at 1064. The
system is effective, but overinclusive,—it runs into significant problems when some of the
transactions that would be coded as gambling are illegal in a given jurisdiction, while others are not.
Id. at 1072. In contrast, membership fees for cyberlockers could not be coded in the same way as
gambling transactions, and even if they could, such a system would be too overinclusive to be
justified. In SOPA/PIPA, the payment systems provisions operated much less comprehensively—
they could only be invoked against specific sites that were adjudicated to be dedicated to infringing
use. H.R. 3261 § 103(a), 103(b)(1); S. 968 § 4(a)(1), 4(d)(2)(a). Since the two legislative schemes
would be markedly different, it is difficult to argue from the success of the UIGEA to the success of
the payment provisions of SOPA/PIPA.
212 See generally Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in
Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV. 81 (2010).
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focuses on education, with the goal of inducing casual users of pirated content to seek
out legal alternatives.213 In July of 2011, a large consortium of major copyright
owners (including the MPAA, the RIAA, and their members) teamed up with a group
of major service providers (including Comcast, TimeWarner Cable, Verizon, AT&T,
and Cablevision) to create the Center for Copyright Information (“CCI”), which will
administer the newly created “Copyright Alert System” (“CAS”).214 The system
requires ISPs to send up to six notices to users accused of infringement by copyright
owners.215 Though implementation of the CAS has been delayed, CCI’s Executive
Director recently confirmed that the system would be online in the near future.216
France’s controversial HADOPI Law, passed in 2009, is perhaps the most wellknown example of a graduated response system.217 In contrast to the CAS, HADOPI
is a mandatory, statutory regime, administered by a government agency.218 Rather
than six notices and a decrease in service speed, HADOPI provides that a repeat
offender may be disconnected from internet access altogether after three notices.219
Though empirical evidence suggests that the program has been at least moderately

213 CENTER FOR COPYRIGHT INFORMATION, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING at 1 (2011),
available
at
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/sites/default/files/Momorandum%20of%20Understanding.pdf.
214 Id. at 3.
215 Id. at 8–13. The system comprises four steps: (1) an initial educational step, in which the
ISP sends up to two notices explaining that a content owner has complained of the user’s conduct,
and giving information about the nature and effects of online infringement; (2) an acknowledgment
step, in which the ISP sends up to two more notices which require the user to acknowledge receipt
and agree to cease infringing before she can access the internet; (3) a mitigation measures step, in
which the ISP sends another notice to the user, this time incorporating all elements of the
educational acknowledgment notices, as well as informing the user that the ISP will take one of
several mitigation measures if the user does not seek an administrative review (administered by the
American Arbitration Association). The mitigation measures include temporarily downgrading the
speed of the user’s service in a number of different ways, temporarily directing the user to an
educational landing page every time she connects to the internet, and temporarily restricting the
user’s internet access; and (4) a post mitigation measures step in which the ISP informs the user
that she may be subject to a lawsuit for copyright infringement and/or imposes additional or
alternative mitigation measures. Id. at 10–13.
216 Jill Lesser, The Copyright Alert System:
Moving to Implementation, CENTER FOR
COPYRIGHT INFO. (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.copyrightinformation.org/node/709.
217 Nathan Lovejoy, Procedural Concerns with the HADOPI Graduated Response Model, JOLT
DIGEST (Jan. 13, 2011, 10:16 PM), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/copyright/procedural-concernswith-the-hadopi-graduated-response-model (characterizing HADOPI as “the most prominent
example of the legislative-backed graduated response schemes”).
218 Loi 2009-669 du 12 juin 2009 favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la création sur
Internet [Law 2009-669 of June 12, 2009 promoting the diffusion and protection of creation on the
Internet], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE],
June 13, 2009, p. 9666.
219 Alain Strowel, Internet Piracy as a Wake-up Call for Copyright Law Makers – Is the
“Graduated Response” a Good Reply?, 1 W.I.P.O.J. 75, 80 (2009).
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successful,220 the newly elected French Government plans to significantly decrease
funding to HADOPI, arguing that its costs outweigh its benefits.221
Importantly, graduated response systems raise significant issues regarding the
rights of users.222 Many of these issues are tied to the scheme in general—if law and
practice incentivize copyright owners to err on the side of overprotection, a simple
graduated response system just adds more ways for them to assert their ownership
rights erroneously, infringing on users’ rights to substantive due process, free speech,
and privacy.
C. The Best Available Technology Standard
In an important recent article, Lital Helman and Gideon Parchomovsky have
proposed a comprehensive solution to the problems the existing legal framework
poses for online service providers and copyright owners alike.223 By making filtering
of uploaded content prior to notification of infringement a prerequisite for safe harbor
protection, they argue, Congress could bring clarity and predictability to the field,
and give all parties strong incentives to eradicate infringement without crippling
innovation or chilling speech.224
Helman and Parchomovsky’s “best available technology” standard adds a prenotification requirement to the existing notice and takedown procedure,—a service
provider must filter uploaded content using a technology that meets current
standards.225 The proposed system would include a single database,226 in which
copyright owners would deposit information about the legal status of their works.227
220 See Glenn Peoples, Can Copyright Alerts Work in U.S.? Hadopi Report Brings Promising
Signs, BILLBOARD.BIZ (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry/legal-andmanagement/business-matters-can-copyright-alerts-work-1007993712.story. Peoples cites recent
reports and studies which indicate that, since passage of the law, recipients of notices have tended
to refrain from infringing, peer-peer traffic has decreased, and digital sales have increased. Id.
221 Bruce Crumley, Why France’s Socialists Won’t Kill Sarkozy’s Internet Piracy Law, TIME
MAG. (Aug. 2, 2012), http://world.time.com/2012/08/02/why-frances-socialists-wont-fully-kill-offsarkozys-internet-piracy-law/.
222 See Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1394–1403 (2010).
223 Lital Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best Available Technology Standard, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1194 (2011).
224 Id. at 1197. Helman and Parchomovsky argue that, on top of encouraging webhosts to
implement anti-infringement filtering technology, their new scheme would “serve as a constant spur
for technology companies to improve existing filtering technologies toward more accurate
identification and removal of infringing content on the one hand, and retention of noninfringing
content on the other.” Id.
225 Id. at 1217. The best available technology is defined as “the technology that offers the best
effectiveness/cost ratio,” where effectiveness is defined as the ratio of infringing works blocked to
non-infringing works blocked. Id. at 1218. False positives and false negatives are treated equally,
because “developers of filtering mechanisms should have an equal incentive to invest in minimizing
both types of mistakes.” Id. at 1218–19.
226 Id. at 1221. The database would be created under the supervision of either the Copyright
Office or a private body akin to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), which administers domain names. Id. at 1222.
227 Id. at 1219–22. This would give each filtering system the ability to check uploaded files
against every registered copyrighted work without having to go from copyright owner to copyright
owner to track down the relevant information. Id.
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Because filtering displays economies of scale, the proposal also calls for the
establishment of several competitive clearinghouses to provide filtering services for
webhosts.228 An agency, either independent or under the auspices of the Copyright
Office, would maintain a list of the best available filtering technologies.229 To avoid
liability, a website proprietor would need only show that the filter employed by the
site (or by its commissioned clearinghouse) was on the list at the time of the alleged
infringement.230
At bottom, two key considerations inform this proposal. First, websites that host
user content are better situated to detect infringing uploads than copyright owners,
because websites already control their own systems.231 Second, pre-notification
enforcement, if effective, would substantially diminish the need for costly litigation
by introducing legal certainty.232
Professors Sonia Katyal and Jason Schultz recently responded critically to
Helman and Parchomovsky’s proposal.233 Katyal and Schultz argue that the best
available technology standard would benefit an unproven industry (content filtration)
at the expense of “proven drivers of economic growth” (web services and content
dissemination industries).234
They challenge Helman and Parchomovsky’s
assumption that the costs of copyright-owner enforcement are prohibitive.235
Further, they contend that shifting filtering responsibility to service providers could
have significant negative effects on the performance of their services and the internet
at large.236 Moreover, Katyal and Schultz question the capacity of automated filters
to adequately account for fair use and other complicating aspects of the modern
infringement determination,237 and contend that Helman and Parchomovsky fail to
adequately address due process238 and free speech concerns.239

228 Id. at 1215–16. Filtering systems are expensive to install, update, and maintain, but the
cost of each upload is constant and low. Id. at 1215. Competition among clearinghouses provides a
strong incentive both to the clearinghouses themselves and to developers of filtering technology to
improve the quality and efficiency of their filtering services. Id. at 1216.
229 Id. at 1224–25. The agency would update the list periodically, and filtering centers whose
technology had become outdated would be given a reasonable time to update their systems. Id. at
1236.
230 Id. at 1236.
231 Id. at 1213. To implement an effective filtering system, a party must have two things: (1) a
list of files to compare against the uploads, and (2) access to the system whose uploads are being
filtered. Id. As a practical matter, it is far more plausible to require copyright owners to deposit
their information in a database accessible to service providers than it is to require service providers
to provide access to their system to every copyright owner. Id. at 1213–14.
232 Id. at 1227–28.
Since the proposal clarifies and ensures application of safe harbor
protection to online service providers that follow procedures to filter uploads to their sites, a
copyright owner would be unwise to bring a lawsuit against such a service provider. Id. at 1227.
233 Sonia Katyal & Jason Schultz, The Unending Search for the Optimal Infringement Filter,
112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 83 (2012).
234 Id. at 88.
235 Id. at 90.
236 Id. at 91.
237 Id. at 96–101.
238 Id. at 102–104.
239 Id. at 104–106.
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D. Digital Fingerprinting as a Standard Technical Measure
What if a workable filtering requirement could be achieved without additional
legislation? As noted supra, OCILLA requires all service providers to “accommodate
and . . . not interfere with standard technical measures.”240 In a recent article,
Lauren Gallo argues that this provision could support a filtering requirement
because digital fingerprinting technology meets the statutory definition of a standard
technical measure.241 Digital fingerprinting services work by extracting identifying
features from digital files to create a profile that can be checked against a database of
other such profiles.242 Recall that under the statute a standard technical measure
must be relatively inexpensive, reasonably available, “used by copyright owners to
identify or protect copyrighted works,” and developed pursuant to a broad consensus
of copyright owners and service providers.243
It is self-evident that copyright owners use digital fingerprinting technology to
identify copyrighted works. Audible Magic, a leader in the copyright filtering
industry, scales its pricing based on volume of upload, even offering its service at no
cost to low-volume customers.244 This example demonstrates a likelihood that digital
fingerprinting satisfies the cost and availability requirements. That leaves the
question of broad consensus.
In 2007, a group of copyright owners and media companies came together to
adopt the User Generated Content Principles (“UGC Principles”), a voluntary
agreement which, in most pertinent part, imposes on user generated content services
an unenforceable requirement that they implement commercially reasonable content
identification technology.245 In the years following adoption of the UGC Principles,
large numbers of content owners and service providers have implemented digital
fingerprinting technology.246 Ms. Gallo argues that these two constituencies should
acknowledge that the required consensus has been reached.247

17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(B) (2012).
Lauren G. Gallo, Note, The (Im)Possibility of “Standard Technical Measures” for UGC
Websites, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 283, 284 (2011).
242 See MEDIAHEDGE, DIGITAL FINGERPRINTING WHITE PAPER at 5 (2010), available at
http://www.mediahedge.com/fileadmin/bestanden/pdf/White_Paper_-_Digital_Fingerprinting_by_
Mediahedge_01-2010.pdf.
243 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2).
244 Copyright Compliance, AUDIBLE MAGIC, http://audiblemagic.com/solutions-compliance.php
(last visited Nov. 26, 2012).
245 Press Release, User Generated Content Coalition, Internet and Media Industry Leaders
Unveil Principles to Foster Online Innovation While Protecting Copyrights (Oct. 18, 2007),
http://www.ugcprinciples.com/press_release.html; Principles for User Generated Content Services,
http://www.ugcprinciples.com/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2012).
246 See
SmartID
Customers
&
Partners,
AUDIBLE
MAGIC,
http://www.audiblemagic.com/customers-contentid.php (last visited Nov. 26, 2012) (listing 47
webhost-clients including facebook, Microsoft, myspace, and Verizon); Content Owners, AUDIBLE
MAGIC, http://audiblemagic.com/customers-contentregistration.php (last visited Nov. 26, 2012)
(listing 20 content owner-clients including Disney, NBC Universal, and Viacom); Clients,
CIVOLUTION, http://www.civolution.com/clients-and-partners/clients/ (listing 39 clients); Content ID,
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Nov. 26, 2012) (explaining YouTube’s
comprehensive digital fingerprinting system).
247 Gallo, supra note 241, at 314–15.
240
241
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In response to the UGC Principles, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”)
and a group of non-profit organizations propounded their Fair Use Principles for
User Generated Video Content.248 Among other things, the Principles would require
a showing that 90% or more of the source file be present in order for a file to be
blocked.249 Such a requirement would do much to protect fair use, but would be ripe
for abuse via token compliance—a user could post 89% of a given work in a blatantly
infringing manner, and the copyright owner would have no recourse. Additionally,
requiring webhosts to check full uploaded files against full source material files
would saddle them with an undue burden.
E. A Comprehensive Policy for Online Infringement Reduction
The emergence of cyberlockers is one of many recent trends demonstrating that
the current legal framework permits business plans that promote and indeed rely on
infringement, while flouting the due process and free speech rights of users. The
OCILLA is failing to achieve its purposes. Significant changes are necessary.
The best available technology proposal and the standard technical measure
proposal both rightly point to the need for universal use of filtering technology. Their
duty to filter is a bright line intent requirement that clarifies the Grokster rule’s
application by making intent a binary issue.250 It is more efficient than an actual
intent requirement because it represents a brighter line—not only is intent analyzed,
but the specific method of proving intent is enumerated. Further, their filtering
requirement would deter online storage providers from technically complying with
OCILLA while allowing, or relying on, mass infringement.
But how would these filters take account of fair use and other defenses? Helman
and Parchomovsky argue that filters are likely to get better at detecting fair use
through effective use of quantitative proxies, and that they could be supplemented by
human review.251 Because fair use is a necessarily flexible doctrine on which even
reasonable judges, scholars, and lawyers disagree, it is almost self-evident that the
ideal of an automated filter that sufficiently addresses fair use in all cases is
practically unattainable.252
Katyal and Schultz argue that the inability of technology to reliably address
factual questions of copyright infringement, or to properly protect the due process
and free speech rights of users, counsels in favor of maintaining the current
system.253 Further, they question “whether a system involving both filtering and
248 Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/pages/fair-use-principles-user-generated-video-content (last visited Nov. 26,
2012).
249 Id.
250 See Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 586–88. Professor Ginsburg points out that the Grokster
decision was unclear as to whether the combination of a failure to filter and a business plan that
benefits from infringement would suffice to establish liability. Id.
251 Helman & Parchomovsky, supra note 223, at 1229–32.
252 See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2543 n.37 (2009)
(“Particularly in close fair use cases, judges are likely to differ in their predisposition to err in favor
or against fair use defenses; some inconsistency in fair use case law is inevitable.”).
253 Katyal & Schultz, supra note 233, at 100.
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human review would be any more efficient than the current one.”254 But the current
system has incentivized webhosts to adopt (imperfect) filtering technology in ways
that also raise substantial due process and free speech concerns.255 A new system
which combines mandated filtering with meaningful protections for users’ rights is in
order.
Because a filter is unlikely to account meaningfully for qualitative
considerations, the system should employ quantitative proxies to efficiently dispose
of the easy cases. Because quantitative proxies will necessarily get closer cases
wrong, the automated system must be supplemented by human review. Such an
arrangement reduces costs by directing expensive human review to the close cases
where it is indispensable. Furthermore, in the extreme case where a webhost builds
its business on obvious infringement, copyright owners should be provided with
effective legal remedies which afford adequate due process.
This author proposes that, in lieu of an (unlikely) express private agreement or
legislative enactment, courts begin holding that digital fingerprinting qualifies as a
standard technical measure under § 512(i). The interested parties—mass content
owners, webhosts, and consumer groups—should then form a non-profit standards
organization (hereinafter Digital Copyright Standards Organization – “DCSO”) to
implement an efficient review system that would equitably allocate the costs of
necessary infringement determinations.
To account for fair use and other defenses, and to more adequately address due
process concerns, a “filter-and-review” system would be instituted. The system would
implement a “X% of the fingerprint” rule. That is, only files incorporating more than,
say, 90% of a protected fingerprint would be subject to automatic blocking. In that
situation, the uploading user would be entitled to pursue administrative review.
Further, the webhost would be required to keep track of uploads that contain less
than 90%, but more than, say, 60%, of the underlying fingerprint. Files in this
second category would be tabulated both by user and by work: So, if for example a
user of a given site uploaded a file containing 60% or more of a protected fingerprint,
the webhost would be required to notify that user that her upload contained an
unusually large proportion of copyrighted material according to the site’s filter. After
ten such uploads, each of the uploads would be blocked. The user would have a right
to administrative review regarding any or all of the subject uploads after receiving
notice. That process would also become available to a copyright owner if users
uploaded files containing 60% or more of a given work’s fingerprint to a given site
five times or more.
Because this new regime would operate under § 512(i) and would not displace
the notice and takedown provisions, a copyright owner could seek removal of any
alleged infringement not detected by the new scheme by filing a regular notice
pursuant to § 512(c)(3).

Id.
See Ke Steven Wan, Managing Peer-to-Peer Traffic with Digital Fingerprinting and Digital
Watermarking, 41 SW. L.J. 331, 345–47 (2012). Professor Wan argues that the notice and takedown
provisions fail to provide adequate recourse to users with credible defenses, and chill free speech by
giving webhosts strong incentives to forego analysis and merely take down every file about which
they receive a notice. Id.
254
255
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The proposed administrative review process could loosely follow the framework
of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”)256 with important
changes. Briefly, the UDRP establishes an administrative review process for
disputes over domain names that allegedly infringe trademarks.257 Each owner of a
domain name agrees to submit to the process as part of the registration agreement
for the domain name.258 The complaining trademark owner selects the provider of
arbitration services from a list of approved providers.259 After a panel of one or three
arbitrators is appointed, the panel reviews the submissions of each party and enters
a decision within fourteen days.260
The proposed DCSO would also approve a set of dispute resolution service
providers, but unlike the UDRP, it would dictate random selection of the provider in
each case. Next, the provider would arrange for an administrative arbitrator, or, at
the election of either party, an administrative panel of three, to hear the case.
Finally, the arbitrator or panel would accept evidence from both parties, and submit
its decision within fourteen days. Because costs would need to be low enough to
ensure broad access to the review process, but not so low as to encourage frivolous
challenges, the author proposes that content owners and webhosts jointly contribute
to a subsidy fund, and that the remaining cost of a given dispute be borne by the
losing party.
Further, the author proposes incorporating the least controversial remedies set
forth in SOPA/PIPA—cessation of services from payment systems and advertisers.
The availability of these remedies would enhance enforcement both in the transition
phase and after the new scheme is implemented. Indeed, the proposed system would
facilitate the administration of these remedies, because brazen failure to adopt an
approved filtering system would provide clear cause for invoking them.
Lastly, a voluntary graduated response system like the CAS would supplement
these measures by educating users and promoting legal alternatives to piracy.

CONCLUSION
In sum, the ascent of cyberlockers is one of many significant challenges to the
current legal framework surrounding online protection of copyrighted work. To date,
courts’ attempts to discern and apply vague doctrines and inconsistent precedents in
the context of this burgeoning technology have yielded uncertainty for all parties.
It would be naïve to expect that Internet piracy could somehow be completely
eradicated. Like alcohol and drug abuse, these practices will surely continue
regardless of the level at which they are regulated. But we can still do better than
we are doing right now. A new filtering scheme that provides a clear exemption from
liability conditioned on adoption of pre-notification anti-infringement measures
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would replace murky standards with clarity and produce effective copyright
enforcement naturally, by way of economic incentives. The changes proposed in this
article are designed to emphasize the importance of a multi-faceted approach to the
complex problems presented by online copyright infringement, and to sketch the form
such an approach might take.

